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Sounding New Media: Immersion 
and Embodiment in the Arts 
and Culture by Frances Dyson. 
Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2009. Pp. 262. $60.00 cloth, 
$28.95 paper.
In tracing the hitherto overlooked 
influence of sound on the theory 
and practice of new media art, 
Frances Dyson’s Sounding New 
Media offers a productive point of 
entry into historicizing 1990s cy-
berculture and the newness of new 
media. Dyson’s central argument is 
twofold. First, Dyson claims that 
the features that supposedly mark 
new media as new—qualities such 
as tactile interactivity and total 
sensory immersion—have roots in 
older, predominantly sonic media 
(e.g., radio, telephone, and early 
electroacoustic sound art). In devel-
oping this first claim, Dyson argues 
additionally that “sound is simulta-
neously neglected and appropriated 
by the rhetorics of immersion and 
embodiment that have inaugurated 
new media discourse and have an-
nounced new media as ‘new’” (6). 
That is, for Dyson, the rhetorical 
frameworks through which we 
make sense of sound—the distinc-
tion between original sound and 
recorded sound, for instance, or 
between signal and noise—have 
quietly and tacitly laid the ground-
work for the visual and tactile 
tropes we tend to use when we talk 
about digital media. At stake, then, 
is the redemption of the aural in a 
regime that only seems to be domi-
nated by other sense modalities.
Although Sounding New Media 
offers a compelling impressive 
account of new media, the book 
has greater consequences for what 
has become a central problem for 
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scholarship on audiovisual media 
in general—namely, the relation-
ship between the modal and the 
amodal. By modal, I mean the idea 
that sensory experience differenti-
ates into discrete modalities: sight, 
sound, touch, smell, and so on. In 
contrast, to describe sensation as 
amodal is to emphasize how any 
given perceptual event cannot be 
reduced to just one modality. When 
a car speeds by me, for instance, I 
not only hear and see the car but 
also feel a rush of air and a slight 
rumble. In cinema and media stud-
ies, the following questions arise: 
How do media such as the cinema 
and television use sight and sound 
to evoke sensations that resonate in 
the human body amodally, beyond 
merely the visual and sonic modali-
ties? And, for that matter, how can 
we identify ourselves as scholars in 
one modality—musicology, sound 
studies, visual culture, and so on—
while doing justice to the rich-
ness and complexity of resonance 
among multiple modalities? Dyson 
answers these questions by using 
a sonic figure: the embodied voice. 
The dominant tendency in cinema 
and media studies, however, has 
been to answer in another register: 
that of touch.
The aspect of touch that has 
done the most theoretical work is 
the reflexivity of self-touching—in 
particular, the experience of touch-
ing one’s left hand with one’s right 
hand. Especially in film theory, 
scholars such as Jennifer Barker 
and Vivian Sobchack have taken 
this figure from Maurice Merleau-
Ponty, who uses it to describe the 
fundamental reversibility of sub-
ject and object in perception. For 
example, for Barker, just as I may 
reverse between being in my left 
hand touching the right hand and 
in my right hand touching the left, 
so, in the cinema, may I reverse be-
tween being in my body and being 
in the counterfactual world of the 
film.1 The amodal is central to this 
discussion in that tactile structures 
come to underpin all other sense 
modalities; the tactile is posited as 
the reversibility from which all 
other modes of reversibility derive. 
This bias toward the tactile—and 
an attendant denigration of the vi-
sual—is less ingrained in the field 
of media studies, in which Dyson 
is writing, than it is in the nar-
rower field of cinema studies. It is, 
however, present, and is best ex-
emplified by media theorist Mark 
B. N. Hansen’s concept of “pri-
mary tactility,” which he develops 
in Bodies in Code (2006). Tactility 
is primary or originary for Han-
sen in that other modalities, such 
as vision, need something outside 
the body—a “technical artifact,” 
such as a mirror—to produce the 
kind of specular, reflexive relation 
(seeing oneself seeing-oneself) that 
self-touching has from the start, 
without such an exteriorization 
or artifact.2 Hansen invokes Jean 
Laplanche and Didier Anzieu to 
argue productively that we should 
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understand this derivation of vision 
from touch in terms of anaclisis—a 
psychoanalytic term for the way in 
which psychic processes are at first 
synonymous with, but eventually 
detach from, biological processes. 
Hansen generalizes anaclisis, argu-
ing that it underpins not only the 
individual psyche but also the hu-
man’s relation to technology: ana-
clisis becomes the name for how 
amodal structures (originally tac-
tile ones, for Hansen) detach from 
one sense modality and move to 
another with the support of a tech-
nical exteriorization, as when the 
mirror exteriorizes the reflexivity 
of touch and extends it to vision.
Although Dyson never men-
tions the concept of anaclisis ex-
plicitly in Sounding New Media, 
an important consequence of her 
book is that it offers an alternative 
account of anaclisis, technicity, and 
the amodal—one that posits the 
aural rather than the tactile as the 
primary structure of the amodal. 
Specifically, Dyson offers the fig-
ure of the autoaffective voice: the 
reflexive, proprioceptive feeling of 
oneself speaking (the resonance of 
one’s voice inside one’s own ears, 
chest cavity, and vocal cords). In 
the first chapter, “Ethereal Trans-
missions,” Dyson looks at gestures 
toward the voice in ancient Greek 
metaphysics, Christian theology, 
and Descartes, arguing that the re-
flexivity of speaking is the anaclitic 
ground for the way these accounts 
develop the metaphysical concept 
of the inner voice—the voice inside 
one’s head, abstracted from all ex-
teriority, and synonymous with 
the amodal domain of thought. As 
Dyson puts it,
Decontaminating the voice 
has occupied Western meta-
physics for millennia—a pro-
cess that predates the voice’s 
actual mechanical reproduc-
tion and transmission—and 
can be roughly characterized 
in three phases: first, remov-
ing air from the voice—the 
voice becomes anaerobic; 
second, removing temporal 
and spatial presence—the 
voice becomes anechoic; and 
finally, removing  sonority—
the voice becomes static and 
silent. (20)
Whereas traditional metaphysics 
holds that the silent, inner voice of 
thought exists prior to, and extends 
outward into, the phenomenal 
world through the audible voice, 
Dyson claims that the inverse is true. 
For Dyson, the psychical process 
of thinking of oneself- thinking—
Descartes’s cogito ergo sum, or “I 
think, therefore I am”—actually 
derives its reflexive structure ana-
clitically, from the bodily reflexivity 
of feeling oneself-speaking. Anacli-
sis, however, involves not only the 
derivation of psychical structures 
from biological structures but also 
(to use Dyson’s term) an eventual 
“decontamination” or detachment 
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of the psychical from the biologi-
cal. That is, the inner voice derives 
from the detachment of the em-
bodied voice from the speaker’s 
vocal cords, resonant bodily cavi-
ties, and breath (“the voice becomes 
anaerobic”) and thus also from the 
materiality of the acoustic world 
(“the voice becomes anechoic”).
The figure of the inner voice, and 
its anaclitic detachment from the 
embodied voice, recurs through-
out Sounding New Media. For in-
stance, where Hansen argues that 
the mirror and other visual media 
extend the reflexivity of touch into 
the visual modality, Dyson makes a 
similar claim in the second chapter, 
“Celestial Telegraphies”—namely, 
that audio technologies such as the 
telephone and radio technically ex-
tend the inner voice of metaphysics. 
As Dyson puts it,
Electricity and  technology 
thus act as a conduit through 
which the presence of the 
voice, in its metaphysical 
guise, can be reasserted. 
The characteristics of inner 
speech: that it is silent, atopic, 
self-directed, and timeless 
can easily be transferred to 
the perception of the elec-
tronic voice, since both occur 
in the absence, the here-and-
now embodiment of the 
speaker. (51)
For Dyson, the ability of tele-
phone and radio to function despite 
abstracting the voice from the body 
and space-time of the speaker hinges 
on the fact that the embodied voice 
had already, centuries earlier, been 
abstracted in another register: that 
of thought, or the “inner speech” of 
the metaphysical tradition. This is 
to say that, just as Hansen’s mirror 
exteriorizes in the visual modal-
ity the originary, primary reflexiv-
ity of self-touching—seeing-seen 
exteriorizes touching-touched—so 
does the telephonic or radiophonic 
voice’s framing of signal and noise, 
or message and medium, exterior-
ize the structure of the inner voice: 
“By amplifying the volume of the 
voice at close range, rendering in-
audible any extraneous sound, and 
concealing as much as possible the 
presence of the technology, the 
broadcast voice echoes the autoaf-
fective circuit of its metaphysical 
corollary” (53). That is, the close-
range radio (or telephone) micro-
phone picks up the speaker’s voice 
while filtering out the sonic back-
ground, just as metaphysics picks 
up the inner voice while filtering 
out the extraneous sound of its res-
onance in the speaker’s body.
It is important to emphasize, 
however, that Dyson’s claims 
about embodiment and technical 
exteriorization involve a different 
methodology than Hansen’s. Han-
sen poses his object of inquiry as a 
problem for phenomenology, while 
Dyson approaches hers primarily as 
a rhetorical problem. That is, Han-
sen seeks to describe encounters 
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with new media from the inside, 
as it were, in terms of embodied 
experience, whereas Dyson sets out 
to analyze encounters with new 
media from the outside, to unpack 
and historicize the discourse and 
rhetoric around them. In this re-
spect, Dyson retains the method-
ological orientation of what might 
be called the “second wave” of 
sound studies in the humanities. 
The first wave of sound studies—
exemplified by work in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, from film and 
media scholars such as John Belton, 
Alan Williams, Rick Altman, and 
Tom Levin—takes the approach 
of ideology critique, arguing that 
successful sound reproduction boils 
down to deception: the listener 
is deceived into experiencing the 
audio recording as identical with 
the original sound event.3
In contrast, scholars writing 
in the second wave—James Las-
tra, Jonathan Sterne, and Emily 
Thompson, among others writing 
in the early 2000s—aspire not to 
criticize the perceived identity be-
tween original and copy, but rather 
to look at the historical and cultural 
conditions that make the original/
copy distinction possible in the first 
place. In The Audible Past (2003), 
for instance, Sterne argues that 
what is at stake is not an ontologi-
cal disjuncture between a recorded 
sound and an original sound, but 
rather how listeners put their “faith 
in the social function and organi-
zation of machines” through the 
practice of what Sterne calls “audile 
technique.”4 For example, in order 
to feel a sense of participation in the 
telephone network, users practice a 
kind of culturally learned listening 
technique: they attend to the voice 
while ignoring the noise of the tele-
phone line—just as the vinyl fe-
tishist places his or her faith in the 
machine by attending to the music 
while ignoring the crackles and 
pops of vinyl, or the physician by 
attending to the patient’s heartbeat 
while tuning out the the stethoscope 
tube’s constant hum. Although 
Dyson herself (unconvincingly) de-
nies it, there is a striking resonance, 
here, between Sterne’s examples of 
audile technique and Dyson’s claim 
that audio technologies filter out 
noise from signal while technically 
extending the way in which meta-
physics filters out the embodied 
voice from the inner voice (77–80). 
That is, for both Sterne and Dyson 
(and for Lastra and Thompson, 
as well), listeners have not been 
deceived into conflating recorded 
sound and original sound so much 
as they have inherited culturally in-
grained techniques for attending to 
certain aspects of sound and ignor-
ing other aspects.
Dyson moves beyond this 
 second-wave approach, however, 
in that she offers a sustained ac-
count of how the rhetoric of audio 
fidelity has had an impact outside 
the history of sound media, and 
on 1990s new media art in partic-
ular. In the third chapter, “Aural 
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Objects and Recording Devices,” 
Dyson impressively traces this lin-
eage back to the sound art of the 
1950s and 1960s, devoting most of 
her attention to the work of Pierre 
Schaeffer and John Cage. Regard-
ing the former, Dyson focuses on 
Schaeffer’s concepts of acousmatic 
listening and the sound object. 
Acousmatic listening names a mode 
of listening in which the listener 
experiences a sound on its own 
terms, without reference to a vis-
ible sound source, while the sound 
object refers to the kind of sound 
Schaeffer prescribes for acousmatic 
listening. Similar to the telephonic 
or radiophonic voice, Schaeffer’s 
sound object inherits the anechoic 
status of the inner voice, in that it 
is detached (through audio record-
ing) from any real-world acoustic 
context. The other defining char-
acteristic of the sound object is that 
it becomes a repeatable, enduring 
object in being recorded, and stored 
for future playback, on the (at the 
time) new medium of magnetic 
tape. The upshot for Dyson is that 
Schaeffer “reaches into aurality and 
the unknowable reality it represents 
and transforms it into a phenom-
enon that can be known through a 
prosthetic ear” (58). That is, Schaef-
fer aspires to extend the enduring 
objecthood and epistemological 
clarity traditionally associated with 
visual objects (e.g., I know that I 
have seen the same house today 
that I saw yesterday) to the more 
ephemeral, more fluid (and for 
that reason unknowable) identity 
of sounds. For Dyson, Schaeffer 
thus prefigures the 1990s discourse 
around the posthuman and the cy-
borg by imagining a “prosthetic 
ear” technically extended to func-
tion like an eye: recording and re-
playing an otherwise fleeting sound 
event gives the listener the ability to 
know that sound as an enduring ob-
ject, as if technologically to extend 
into the aural modality the certi-
tude with which vision registers 
physical objects as having a stable 
identity over time.
According to Dyson, Schaeffer’s 
concepts of prosthetic listening and 
the sound object inherit the inner 
voice’s metaphysical framework 
insofar as they valorize the detach-
ment of sounds from the ephemeral 
space-time of real-world acoustics. 
John Cage’s investment in silence 
and radio does something simi-
lar for Dyson: it works within the 
metaphysical framework laid out 
by the inner voice, while looking 
ahead toward the rhetoric of cy-
berspace and virtual environments. 
Dyson claims that, in works such as 
Imaginary Landscape No. 4 (1951) 
for twelve radio receivers, radio is 
amenable to Cage’s defamiliariza-
tion of silence since “the broadcast 
signal, dependent on the workings 
of an already existing technology, 
can remain silent in the living si-
lence of the yet-to-be-tuned air-
waves . . . a silence whose presence 
is actualized even when its sonorous 
potential is not” (62). For Dyson, 
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the figure of “yet-to-be tuned air-
waves” enables Cage to argue for 
a redefinition of silence, not as the 
absence of sound, but instead as the 
presence of vibrations (radio waves) 
outside the range of what is hu-
manly perceptible. Cage thus valo-
rizes the figure of vibrations that 
withdraw—like the inner voice 
for metaphysics, or the nonspace 
of networked computers for early 
commentators on cyberculture—
into an amodal state below or to the 
side of the phenomenal.
After tracing these neglected 
sonic roots of 1990s cyberculture 
in the first half of Sounding New 
Media, Dyson finally moves to spe-
cific examples of sound-indebted 
new-media art in the book’s final 
three chapters. In the fifth chapter, 
“Immersion,” for instance, Dyson 
considers the work of artist Char 
Davies, arguing that the importance 
of sound to Davies’s immersive envi-
ronment Osmose (1995) has been ig-
nored in a way that is symptomatic 
of Sounding New Media’s broader 
thesis: that new-media art appropri-
ates aspects of aurality but does so in 
a way that conceals this indebted-
ness to sound. As evidence, Dyson 
analyzes responses from participants 
at the artwork’s premiere, as well as 
Mark B. N. Hansen’s reading of the 
artwork’s tactile aspect. For Dyson, 
both the participant responses and 
Hansen’s account understand Os-
mose to be foregrounding tactile 
interactivity on the part of the user, 
when actually the work foregrounds 
aural interactivity; more precisely, 
both sets of evidence undervalue the 
use of breathing, in its aural rather 
than tactile aspect, as part of the 
work’s navigational interface. Tactile 
interactivity in virtual environments 
emphasizes the sensation of moving 
oneself through space, whereas, in Os-
mose, aural interactivity— regulating 
one’s breathing, continuously at-
tuning it to the interface—forces 
the participant to maintain a kind 
of awkward stillness. Dyson’s point 
is that, in foregrounding aurality 
and uncomfortable stillness rather 
than tactility and seamless self-
movement, Davies “ruptur[es] the 
fiction of the perfect body that vir-
tual embodiment implies,” a “fic-
tion” central to rhetoric around 
cyberspace, virtual environments, 
and the transcendence of the physi-
cal body (117). Dyson thus uses her 
sound-oriented reading of Osmose 
to historicize, and qualify, the lofty 
rhetoric of cyberculture.
Indeed, similar to Sterne’s asser-
tion that early audio technologies 
functioned successfully because lis-
teners put their “faith in the social 
function and organization of ma-
chines,” Dyson argues that new-
media art of the 1990s elicited the 
responses it did because partici-
pants put their faith—perhaps ex-
cessively so—in that art’s utopian 
and transcendent potential. In the 
sixth chapter, “Embodying Tech-
nology: From Sound Effect to 
Body Effect,” Dyson develops an 
argument introduced in the fifth 
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chapter—namely, that participants 
in new-media art events put their 
faith in virtual environments—
which is to say, put their faith in the 
newness of those new media envi-
ronments—precisely by attending 
to certain affective and proprio-
ceptive sensations experienced in 
those environments and ignoring 
others, as if to rehearse in the pro-
prioceptive modality the rhetorical 
framework at work much earlier 
in the case of audio fidelity. Simi-
larly, in the seventh chapter, “At-
mospheres,” Dyson looks at the 
work of Catherine Richards, argu-
ing that the latter’s use of old media 
to reveal a long history of humans’ 
immersion in the electromagnetic 
spectrum asks us to qualify even 
further the newness of our more 
recent immersion in cyberspace 
and digitally constructed media en-
vironments. Despite a fourth chap-
ter that feels out of place—a detour 
through Heidegger that oversim-
plifies the latter’s notion of Stim-
mung and also distracts the reader 
from the more focused media-his-
torical lineage Dyson is attempt-
ing to trace—Sounding New Media 
thus provides a productive, sober-
ing criticism of the future- oriented 
rhetoric around new media. Dyson 
shows, that is, that to ignore the 
quiet influence of the sonic on the 
nonsonic is not only to overlook 
the past, resulting in an incomplete 
media history, but also (more cru-
cially) to misconstrue the amodal 
resonance of the present.
Ian Kennedy is a doctoral candidate in 
Film and Media Studies in the English 
Department at Wayne State University. His 
dissertation addresses the role of sound in 
traversing the relationship between sense 
modalities and the amodal, and ultimately 
traces an art-historical lineage of machinic 
amodality—that is, the use of sound to trans-
late affects that normally withdraw from the 
scale of human experience.
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